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euniverse cannot be dealt with in one stroke and so a bit has to be broken oﬀ and treated
as if the rest did not matter.
Afriat, 1969
1 Introduction
We focus on the revealed preference conditions for consistency of a ﬁnite data set with themaximization
of a weakly separable utility function. Our main contribution is twofold. First, we show that veriﬁcation
of these revealed preference conditions is a diﬃcult problem. In particular, the problem is –complete,
which essentially means that it cannot be solved in polynomial time. As we will discuss below, this ac-
tually motivates our second contribution. Speciﬁcally, we show that the revealed preference conditions
can be veriﬁed by means of elementary integer programming procedures, which are easily implemented
in practice. We demonstrate the versatility of this integer programming approach by showing that it can
also assess homothetic separability and weak separability of the indirect utility function. We illustrate
our approach by applying it to a Spanish panel data set. Finally, we also consider extending our inte-
ger programming approach to account for stochastic issues such as measurement error in the data and
unobserved preference heterogeneity underlying the observed consumption behavior.
Demand analysis is a powerful tool for the measurement of the behavioral and distributional eﬀects
of counterfactual price and income changes. For example tax changes alter the relative prices faced by
the consumer. How the consumer reacts to this, by choosing an alternative consumption bundle, is
subject of the analysis of demand behavior. Typically the researcher estimates the unknown parameters
of a parametric demand system and uses these estimates to calculate pre- and post-reform demands and
and its corresponding welfare implications (see, for example, Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel (1997)).
In this respect, weak separability of the utility function is a frequently used assumption in both the-
oretical and applied demand analysis. A group of goods is said to be weakly separable if the marginal
rate of substitution between any two goods in the group is independent from the quantities consumed
of any good outside this group (Leontief, 1947; Sono, 1961). Weak separability has several convenient
implications.1 First of all, it allows for representing consumption in terms of two stage budgeting. is
means that, in order to determine the demanded quantities of the goods in the separable group, it suf-
ﬁces to know the prices of the goods in this group and the total within–group expenditure. Further,
weak separability is a crucial condition for the construction of group price and quantity indices. Such
aggregates can be useful, for example, to compute group cost of living indices to be used in the welfare
analysis. Finally, from an empirical point of view, weak separability signiﬁcantly reduces the number of
parameters of the demand system to be estimated in practical applications.2
Considering these advantages for both theoretical and empirical work, an important issue concerns
empirically testing the validity of the separability assumption (prior to eﬀectively imposing it). In the
literature, there are two approaches to test for weak separability. One approach uses econometric tech-
niques to verify certain parameter restrictions given a speciﬁc demand model. Although this approach
is fairly ﬂexible in terms of the demand model that is used, it also poses a number of problems.
1See also Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) for a more thorough discussion.
2In this respect, it is important to point out the importance of employing a correct separability structure in empirical de-
mand modeling. On the one hand, using a too narrow structure (i.e. omitting goods that should be included in the separable
grouping) leads to an omitted variables problem, which consequently produces inconsistent parameter estimates in the esti-
mated demand model. On the other hand, including redundant goods in the separability structure may inﬂate the variances
of the parameters, which causes ineﬃcient parameter estimates.
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First, the separability restriction is oen tested usingWald or likelihood ratio test procedures, which
require estimating the full (unrestricted) demand model. Consequently, these tests may suﬀer from a
degrees of freedom problem in the sense that too many parameters must be estimated given the amount
of data.3 Next, if the hypothesis of weak separability is rejected, it is impossible to verify whether this
implies a rejection of weak separability as such or, instead, a rejection of the speciﬁc functional form
imposed on demand a priori. In other words, if the null hypothesis of weak separability is rejected, this
may well be due to the use of a wrong functional form rather than a non–separable utility structure
per se.4 Finally, most econometric tests for separability are based on separability of the indirect utility
function (i.e. separability in prices), which does not imply separability of the direct utility function (i.e.
separability in quantities).5
An alternative approach to test for weak separability is based on revealed preference theory. In
several seminal contributions to the literature, Afriat (1969), Varian (1983) and Diewert and Parkan
(1985) developed revealed preference conditions that characterize the collection of data sets that are
rationalizable by a (weakly) separable utility function.6 e revealed preference approach remedies dif-
ferent problems associated with the econometric approach. First, the revealed preference conditions can
meaningfully be applied to data sets with as few as two observations, which avoids the degrees of freedom
problem discussed above. Further, the revealed preference approach abstains from imposing a speciﬁc
functional form on the utility functions. As such, the tests are insensitive to model misspeciﬁcation.
Finally, the revealed preference approach does not require additional assumptions like homotheticity of
the subutility function or separability of the indirect utility function (although such additional assump-
tions can be imposed and tested; see below).
Unfortunately, the revealed preference conditions have the drawback that they take the form of a
set of nonlinear, quadratic inequalities, which are very hard to verify. In order to avoid this problem,
several heuristics have been proposed that provide separate suﬃcient and necessary conditions for data
consistency with weak separability (see Section 2 for an overview). e lack of an eﬃcient algorithm
to verify the revealed preference conditions raises the question whether such an algorithm exists at all.
In this study, we show that the answer is no. In particular, we prove that the veriﬁcation of the re-
vealed preference conditions for weak separability is an –complete problem. is –completeness
result implies that it is impossible to ﬁnd a polynomial time algorithm that veriﬁes whether a data set
is consistent with the maximization of a weakly separable utility function (unless one can prove  =
). is indicates that we should better look for a widely applied and (for moderately sized problems)
reasonably quick non–polynomial time algorithm to verify the revealed preference conditions. Given
3e degrees of freedom problem could in theory be circumvented by instead using Lagrange multiplier tests. However,
similar to Wald tests, Lagrange multiplier tests require a consistent estimate of the covariance matrix. Although it is relatively
easy to obtain such estimates, these are oen biased in small samples, implying that the Lagrange multiplier test may suﬀer
from a small sample bias.
4Imposing separability conditions on a particular functional formmight lead to additional diﬃculties. In particular, Black-
orby, Primont, and Russell (1978) showed that testing for separability using several econometric speciﬁcations based on local
approximations of the true model (i.e. ﬂexible functional forms) is actually equivalent to testing a much stronger condition.
For example, it turns out impossible to test separability for the translog model without imposing the much more stringent
assumption of additive separability. Barnett and Choi (1989) conﬁrmed this result by means of Monte Carlo simulations.
5A well known suﬃcient condition to obtain that direct and indirect separability coincide is that the subutility function is
homothetic. We refer to Blackorby and Russel (1994) for more discussion.
6e revealed preference conditions for weak separability have been used in many diﬀerent types of applications. See,
for example, Swoﬀord and Whitney (1987, 1988), Barnhart and Whitney (1988), Patterson (1991), Belongia and Chrystal
(1991), Choi and Sosin (1992), Swoﬀord andWhitney (1994), Jones and Mazzi (1996), Cox (1997), Fisher and Fleissig (1997),
Rickertsen (1998), Spencer (2002), Fleissig andWhitney (2003, 2008), Swoﬀord (2005), Serletis and Rangel-Ruiz (2005), Jones,
Dutkowsky, and Elger (2005), Jha and Longjam (2006), Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2007), Hjertstrand (2007, 2009),
Elger, Jones, Edgerton, and Binner (2008), Elger and Jones (2008), and Drake and Fleissig (2008).
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this, we present an easy–to–implement (non–polynomial time) integer programming procedure to ver-
ify the revealed preference conditions. Our approach exploits the equivalence of the generalized axiom
of revealed preference () and a set of mixed integer inequalities. Such an integer programming
approach has proven very useful in the literature that applies revealed preference theory to collective
consumption models, which studies the behavior of multi-person households, and in the literature that
investigates the testable implications of general equilibrium models.7 We extend the insights from this
literature to the model of utility maximization with a weakly separable utility function. is provides a
further demonstration of the usefulness of integer programming techniques to deal with computational
issues related to the practical implementation of revealed preference conditions.
From a theoretical point of view, the coremotivation for adopting an integer programming approach
is that this is a widely accepted and a well known approach to handle –complete problems. Besides
this, we also have a number of other motivations. First of all, our approach can be applied to data sets
with any number of observations. Second, any mixed integer program provides an exact solution in
ﬁnite time. Hence, our approach provides a way to verify the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
a given data set to be consistent with maximization of a weakly separable utility function. Until now,
all existing heuristics either provide a necessary or a suﬃcient condition. Our algorithm is the ﬁrst to
provide an exact solution. A third important argument pro our integer programming approach is that
it provides a versatile framework for analyzing testable implications of diﬀerent model speciﬁcations:
we will show that our approach can easily accommodate for homotheticity of the subutility functions,
and that we can readily adjust our integer programming procedure to test for separability of the indirect
utility function.
We demonstrate the practical usefulness of our approach by applying it to data drawn from the En-
cuesta Continua de Presupestos Familiares (ECPF), a Spanish household survey. In this application we
ﬁrst investigate the performance of our integer programming formulation. We do this by comparing it
to Varian’s three step procedure, which provides separate necessary and suﬃcient conditions for weak
separability (see below for more details). We also study the computational performance of the integer
programming formulation. Secondly, we compare the empirical ﬁt of the four alternative model speciﬁ-
cationsmentioned above: the standard utility maximizationmodel, themodel that additionally imposes
weak separability, the homothetic separability model, and the model that assumes a weakly separable
indirect utility function. Speciﬁcally, following a recent proposal of Beatty and Crawford (2011), we
evaluate these diﬀerent model speciﬁcations in terms of their ‘predictive success’.
As a ﬁnal contribution, we show how our approach can be used to design simple statistical tests for
weak separability that account for measurement error and unobserved preference heterogeneity in the
data. Indeed, the main part of our paper focuses on ‘sharp’ tests of weak separability, which does not
take into account stochastic issues such as measurement error and unobserved preference heterogene-
ity. Dealing with measurement error in the context of revealed preference tests has been well-studied;
see, for example Varian (1985) and Epstein and Yatchew (1985). In this paper we extend and integrate
the test procedure that was recently developed by Fleissig and Whitney (2008) and Jones and Edgerton
(2009) into our integer programming approach to treat measurement error. Next, unobserved prefer-
ence heterogeneity is mainly a problem when working with cross-sectional data, since this implies that
the data need to be ‘averaged’ to subsequently conduct the empirical analysis in terms of ‘representa-
tive’ agents. As we also show in our empirical application, a panel data set allows us to perfectly deal
with this source of heterogeneity, since we can perform our revealed preference tests to each household
7See Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2007, 2009, 2011a), Cherchye, De Rock, Sabbe, and Vermeulen (2008), and
Cherchye, Demuynck, and De Rock (2011c) for integer programming characterizations of household consumption models
and Cherchye, Demuynck, and De Rock (2011e) for integer programming characterizations of general equilibrium models.
4
separately. Nonetheless, heterogeneity may still arise if household preferences vary over time. To take
this into account we use the random utility model with additive heterogeneity that was originally put
forward by Brown and Matzkin (1998). While it is clear that our statistical tests are only a ﬁrst step in
a fully-ﬂedged stochastic analysis, we do believe that they demonstrate once more the versatility of our
approach.
Section 2 introduces the revealed preference conditions for rationalizability under a weakly separa-
ble utility function and presents our –completeness result. Section 3 presents our integer program-
ming approach. Section 4 discusses our empirical application. Section 5 considers the extension of our
integer programming method to account for stochastic issues such as measurement error and unob-
served preference heterogeneity. Section 6 concludes.
2 Revealed preference conditions
To set the stage, we brieﬂy recapture the known revealed preference conditions for the standard utility
maximization model and for the model that additionally imposes weak separability on the utility func-
tion. ese results will be useful for our discussion in the following sections. In this section, we also
state our –completeness result.
Standard utility maximization. Consider a ﬁnite data set D = fpt;xtgt2T, which consists of strictly
positive price vectors pt 2 Rn++ and nonnegative consumption bundles xt 2 Rn+ for consumption
observations t in a (ﬁnite) set T. is data set D is said to be rationalizable if there exists a well–behaved
(i.e. increasing, continuous and concave) utility function u : Rn+ ! R such that, for all observations
t 2 T,
xt 2 argmax
x
u(x) s.t. ptx  ptxt:
In other words, for each observation t it must be the case that the consumed bundle xt maximizes the
utility function u over the set of all aﬀordable consumption bundles.
Next, consider the following concepts. edirect revealed preference relationRD over the set fxtgt2T
is deﬁned by xtRDxv if ptxt  ptxv. In words, we have that xtRDxv if xt was chosen while xv was
also aﬀordable. e indirect revealed preference relation R is the transitive closure of the relation RD;
xtRxv if there exist bundles xw;xr; : : : ;xm such that xtRDxw, xwRDxr; : : : ;xmRDxv. Finally, we say
that fpt;xtgt2T satisﬁes the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preferences () if for all xtRxv it is not
the case that pvxv > pvxt. In words, if xt is indirectly revealed preferred to xv, then it is not the case
that xv was more expensive than xt when xv was bought.
Using these concepts, we can state the following result, which is probably the single most important
theorem in revealed preference theory.
eorem 1. [Varian (1982), based on Afriat (1967)]
e following statements are equivalent:
(i) e data set D = fpt;xtgt2T is rationalizable,
(ii) e data set D = fpt;xtgt2T satisĕes ,
(iii) ere exist strictly positive numbers λt and numbers Ut such that, for all t; v 2 T,
Ut   Uv  λvpv(xt   xv):
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(iv) ere exist numbers ut such that for all t; v 2 T
if uv  ut; then ptxt  ptxv;
if uv > ut; then ptxt < ptxv:
Condition (ii) states that  is necessary and suﬃcient for rationalizability. Condition (iii) pro-
vides an equivalent characterization of utility maximization in terms of so–called Afriat inequalities.
Intuitively, these Afriat inequalities allow us to obtain an explicit construction of the utility levels and
the marginal utility of income associated with each observation t: they deﬁne a utility level Ut and a
marginal utility of income λt (associated with the observed income ptxt) for each observed xt. Condi-
tion (iv) is a reformulation of  in the way it is usually presented in the closely related nonparametric
production literature (see Varian (1984)); in this setting this formulation is known as the ‘strong axiom
of cost minimization’.8 e basic idea behind this condition is very simple: if the utility at observation
v exceeds the utility at observation t (i.e. uv  (>)ut), then it is not the case that xt was more expensive
than xv when xt was bought (i.e. ptxt  (<)ptxv). Otherwise, the rational individual would not be
utility maximizing at t, because (s)he could also aﬀord the preferred bundle xv.
eorem1 provides threemethods to verify whether a data set is rationalizable. e ﬁrstmethodwas
originally suggested by Varian (1982) and focuses on verifying the  condition. emethod consists
of three steps, which comply with the three steps in the deﬁnition of . e ﬁrst step constructs
the relation RD from the data set D = fpt;xtgt2T. A second step computes the transitive closure of
R. Here, Varian suggests using Warshall (1962)’s algorithm, which provides an eﬃcient procedure for
computing transitive closures. e third step veriﬁes if pvxv  pvxt whenever xtRxv. If this is the
case, the data set satisﬁes  and is, therefore, rationalizable. Due to its eﬃciency, this procedure
is very popular in applied work. e second and third method veriﬁes the rationalizability conditions
by testing feasibility of either the Afriat inequalities in condition (iii) or the inequalities in condition
(iv). e Afriat inequalities are linear in the unknowns Ut and λt, which implies that their feasibility
can be veriﬁed using elementary linear programming methods (see Afriat (1967) and Diewert (1973)
for discussions of this method). In a similar vein, feasibility of the inequalities in condition (iv) can be
checked by solving a linear programming problem (in the unknowns ut) applied to the contrapositive
statement of this condition.
Weak separability. To introduce the notion of weak separability, we ﬁrst partition the set of goodsN =
f1; : : : ; ng in two groups. Accordingly, we can split any given consumption bundle into two separate
bundles. e ﬁrst bundle x contains all consumption quantities of the goods from the ﬁrst group and
the second bundle y captures the remaining goods. We denote the full consumption bundle as (x;y).
Likewise, we can split any price vector into a price vector of all goods in the ﬁrst group p and a vector of
prices for the goods in the second group q. Now, consider a data setD = fpt;qt;xt;ytgt2T. We say that
this data set is rationalizable by a weakly separable utility function if there exists a well–behaved utility
function u and a well–behaved subutility function s such that, for all observations t 2 T,
(xt;yt) 2 argmax
x;y
u(x; s(y)) s.t. ptx+ qty  ptxt + qtyt:
Varian (1983) provides the following characterization of behavior that is rationalizable by a weakly
separable utility function.
8is condition is related to the notion of semi–strict quasi–concavity, see Hjertstrand (2008).
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eorem 2. [Varian (1983)]
e following statements are equivalent:
(i) e data set D = fpt;qt;xt;ytgt2T is rationalizable by a weakly separable utility function.
(ii) For all t 2 T there exist nonnegative numbers St and strictly positive numbers δt such that, for all t,
v 2 T,
St   Sv  δvqv(yt   yv); (ii.1)
fpt; 1=δt;xt; Stgt2T satisĕes . (ii.2)
(iii) For all t 2 T, there exist nonnegative numbers St and Ut and strictly positive numbers δt and λt such
that, for all t; v 2 T,
St   Sv  δvqv(yt   yv); (iii.1)
Ut   Uv  λv

pv(xt   xv) + 1δv (St   Sv)

: (iii.2)
(iv) For all t 2 T, there exist numbers St and ut and strictly positive numbers δt such that, for all t; v 2 T,
St   Sv  δvqv(yt   yv); (iv.1)
if uv  ut; then ptxt + 1δt St  ptxv +
1
δt
Sv; (iv.2)
if uv > ut; then ptxt +
1
δt
St < ptxv +
1
δt
Sv: (iv.3)
In contrast to the conditions in eorem 1, the conditions in this theorem are not easily veriﬁed.
e main problem is that, when checking (ii.2), the ‘prices’ 1=δt and the corresponding ‘quantities’ St,
which must satisfy condition (ii.1), are unobserved. is is also reﬂected in condition (iii.2), which is a
set of quadratic inequalities.
e literature brings forward several methods to test the weak separability conditions. Probably the
best known alternative is Varian (1983)’s three step procedure. In the ﬁrst step, this method tests 
consistency of the data set D = fpt;qt;xt;ytgt2T. If the data fail , they are not rationalizable and,
hence, we can reject weak separability.9 By contrast, if the data set satisﬁes , the second step tests
whether the data set fqt;ytgt2T satisﬁes . is  condition is equivalent to condition (ii.1). If
 consistency is rejected in this second step then, again, the data set is not rationalizable by weak
separability. Finally, the third step veriﬁes  of a data set fpt; 1=δt ;xt;Vt gt2T for some speciﬁc
values δt and St that satisfy condition (ii.1). If for this last step  is not rejected, then we conclude
that the data are consistent with weak separability.
Unfortunately, Varian (1983)’s test is not an exact one. In particular, it is possible that a data set is
rationalizable by a weakly separable utility function even if the algorithm does not reach this conclusion.
Simulation results indicate that this may actually occur quite frequently; see, for example, Barnett and
Choi (1989), Fleissig andWhitney (2003), Hjertstrand (2009) and our empirical application in Section 4.
e problem is that the third step of the procedure ﬁxes the values of both δt and Vt in an arbitrary
way. In this respect, however, certain values may be more probable than others. is idea provides
9In fact, if the data set fails to satisfy , then it is not rationalizable by any utility function, whether it is weakly separable
or not.
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the intuition behind the linear program developed by Fleissig and Whitney (2003). In particular, these
authors determine the values of 1=δt and Vt based on the theory of superlative index numbers (see
Diewert (1976, 1978)). A superlative index number provides an exact index number for some order
approximation of the underlying (in casu homogeneous) utility function s. However, this test is again
only suﬃcient but not necessary for weak separability to hold.
An alternative testing strategy is explored by Swoﬀord and Whitney (1994), Elger and Jones (2008)
and Fleissig and Whitney (2008), who use nonlinear programming methods to solve (iii.1) and (iii.2)
simultaneously. is is done by reformulating the problem as a nonlinear minimization problem sub-
ject to a number of linear and nonlinear restrictions. e data set is then rationalizable if the global
optimal solution of this problem is equal to zero. Alas, nonlinear programming problems (with nonlin-
ear restrictions) become computationally burdensome even for moderate sized problems.10 A second
problem with such programming problems is that they do not always yield an optimal solution: most
algorithms search for local optima, which need not be globally optimal (unless some additional concav-
ity assumptions are true). Generally, ﬁnding a global optimum requires a ﬁne grid search over the set
of initial values. But even a very ﬁne grid search cannot exclude that weak separability is rejected while
the assumption eﬀectively holds. We refer to Hjertstrand (2009) for a Monte Carlo comparison of the
diﬀerent test procedures cited in this paragraph.
An–completeness result. Consider a data setD = fpt;qt;xt;ytgt2T. For any such data set, we can
ask the question whether this data set is rationalizable by a weakly separable utility function (i.e. whether
it satisﬁes the conditions ofeorem 2). Basically, this decision problem asks whether any arbitrary data
set is rationalizable by a weakly separable utility function.
In order to analyze this problem, we make use of the theory of computational complexity. is
theory classiﬁes decision problems according to the time it takes to come to an answer “yes” or “no” for
a speciﬁc instance of a given decision problem.11 In our particular case, this boils down to answering
whether or not a data set D is rationalizable by a weakly separable utility function. Time is expressed
with respect to the size of the instance (i.e. the ‘size’ of the data set D). e two most important classes
of decision problems are the classes  and . e class  (polynomial) contains all decision problems
that are easy to solve, by using an algorithm with a number of steps that is polynomial in the size of the
instance. e class  (nondeterministic polynomial) contains all problems that might be diﬃcult to
solve (i.e. it might take exponential time to ﬁnd a solution), but that are easy to verify (i.e. any given
solution to the problem can be veriﬁed in polynomial time).
Of course, any decision problem in the class  is also in . At present, however, it is not known if
the converse also holds. e generally accepted belief is that  6= . A decision problemwhich is at least
as diﬃcult to solve as any problem in the class  is called –hard. A decision problem is –complete
if it is both –hard and in . –complete problems are among the most diﬃcult problems in the
class . ey are considered to be computationally intractable especially for large instances. In fact,
all known solution methods applicable to –complete problems suﬀer from exponential worst-time
complexity.
e following theorem shows that the decision problem associated with the rationalizability condi-
tions of eorem 2 is –complete. e proof is given in Appendix A.
10See Jones, McCloud, and Edgerton (2007) andHjertstrand (2009) formore discussion on this. As an example, an empirical
analyst handling a data set of 60 observations would have to solve an optimization problem with at least 3540 linear and 3540
nonlinear constraints to verify the conditions (iii.1) and (iii.2) in eorem 2.
11For compactness, we here restrict to providing a brief informal introduction to the notion of –completeness. See Garey
and Johnson (1979) and Papadimitriou (1994) for a more detailed discussion.
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eorem 3. e question whether a given data set is rationalizable by a weakly separable utility function
is an –complete problem.
is result considers the general casewithout any restriction on the number of goods or observations.
Of course, it does not rule out speciﬁc instances for which veriﬁcation of the rationalizability conditions
might be performed eﬃciently. Nevertheless, our result does indicate that it is highly improbable that the
problem of rationalizability by a weakly separable utility function can be solved by means of an eﬃcient
algorithm (like, for example, linear programming).
Essentially,eorem 3 implies that one should not waste time trying to construct a polynomial time
algorithm that veriﬁes the conditions ineorem 2 (unless one has taken up the ambitious task of show-
ing that  = ). In turn, this suggests considering easy–to–implement non–polynomial time algorithms
for tackling the testing problem. erefore, we next propose a widely used method called Mixed Integer
Programming (MIP).
3 e mixed integer program
MIP problems look like standard linear programming problems except that certain variables are re-
stricted to be integer valued (in our case either 0 or 1). e MIP formulation has a number of advan-
tages. First of all, a MIP always has an exact result and, moreover, every local solution of a MIP is in
fact a global solution. is last property directly addresses the issue of ﬁnding a global optimum which
we argued is a problem for any of the nonlinear approaches discussed above. Second, as we will show
below, our MIP formulation provides a joint test of the necessary and suﬃcient conditions. is means
that such a MIP test is theoretically unbiased, and therefore, will by deﬁnition always outperform any
sequential procedure for implementing the weak rationalizability conditions from eorem 2. ird,
MIP problems are a frequently used and widely accepted approach to handle –complete problems.
e development of specially tailored algorithms (including heuristics) to solve MIP problems forms an
important topic in the operations research literature (see, for example, Nemhauser and Wolsey (1999)).
As such, there now exist well performing soware programs to solve such problems. In this respect, we
can also refer to our following empirical application, where we will show the application of our MIP
formulations for substantially large data sets. Finally, we demonstrate the ﬂexibility of our approach
by deriving MIP conditions for two related rationalizability problems. First, we consider the speciﬁc
case where the subutility function is homothetic. Secondly, we focus on the case where separability is
imposed on the indirect utility function, i.e. the case of weak separability in prices. ese two cases
are particularly interesting because they are widely used in econometric analyses involving separability
concepts (see also our discussion in the Introduction).
We proceed by translating conditions (iv.1)–(iv.3) to an integer programming setting. e basic idea is
to notice that conditions (iv.2)–(iv.3) are equivalent to the following set of conditions:
if uv  ut; then δtptxt + St  δtptxv + Sv;
if uv > ut; then δtptxt + St < δtptxv + Sv:
is equivalence follows frommultiplying both sides of the right hands side inequalities by δt (> 0).
As such, we see that the inequalities on both the right and le hand side become linear. We make use
of binary variables to capture the logical relation between the diﬀerent inequalities. is leads to the
following mixed integer linear program.
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CS.WS For all t; v 2 T, there exist numbers St; ut 2 [0; 1[, δt 2]0; 1] and binary variables Xt;v 2 f0; 1g
such that, for all observations t and v 2 T, 12
St   Sv  δvqv(yt   yv); (cs.1)
ut   uv < Xt;v; (cs.2)
(Xt;v   1)  ut   uv; (cs.3)
δtpt(xt   xv) + (St   Sv) < Xt;vAt; (cs.4)
(Xt;v   1)Av  δvpv(xt   xv) + (St   Sv): (cs.5)
Here, we let At be some ﬁxed and large number (larger than ptxt + 1). First of all, observe that the
restriction of St; ut and δt to the unit interval is harmless as it is possible to rescale these variables without
changing the revealed preference conditions (iv.1)–(iv.3). Condition (cs.1) reproduces condition (iv.1).
e interpretation behind the binary variables is that Xt;v should be equal to one if and only if ut 
uv. is requirement is formalized by conditions (cs.2) and (cs.3). Finally, conditions (cs.4) and (cs.5)
reformulate conditions (iv.2) and (iv.3) by making use of these binary variables. e following theorem
formalizes the equivalence between the above MIP conditions and the rationalizability conditions for
weak separability in eorem 2. e proof is given in Appendix B.
eorem 4. e data set D = fδtpt; 1;xt; Stgt2T satisĕes (iv.2)–(iv.3) if and only if conditions (cs.2)–
(cs.5) have a solution.
Homothetic and indirect weak separability. e above MIP formulation is very ﬂexible in terms of
incorporating additional (separable) preference structure. We illustrate this by considering two special
cases. e ﬁrst case requires that the subutility function s is homothetic. e second case requires
separability of the indirect utility function.
Adata setD = fpt;qt;xt;ytgt2T is rationalizable by homothetic separability if there exist awell–behaved
utility function u and a well–behaved and homothetic subutility function s such that, for all observations
t 2 T,
(xt;yt) 2 argmax
x;y
u(x; s(y)) s.t. ptx+ qty  ptxt + qtyt:
e following theorem characterizes data sets that are consistent with homothetic separability. e re-
sult directly follows from combining Varian (1983)’s rationalizability conditions for a homothetic utility
function witheorem 2.
eorem 5. e following statements are equivalent:
(i) e data set D = fpt;qt;xt;ytgt2T is rationalizable by homothetic separability.
(ii) For all t 2 T there exist nonnegative numbers Ut and strictly positive numbers St such that, for all
t; v 2 T,
St   Sv  Sv
qvyv
qv(yt   yv),
pt;
qtyt
St
;xt;yt

t2T
satisĕes :
12e strict inequalities in cs.2 and cs.4 are diﬃcult to handle. erefore, in practice, we use a weak inequality and subtract
a very small but ﬁxed number from the right hand side.
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(iii) For all t 2 T, there exist nonnegative Ut and strictly positive numbers St and λt such that, for all
t; v 2 T,
St   Sv  Sv
qvyv
qv(yt   yv);
Ut   Uv  λv

pv(xt   xv) + qvyvSv (St   Sv)

:
(iv) For all t 2 T, there exist numbers ut and strictly positive numbers St such that, for all t; v 2 T,
St   Sv  Sv
qvyv
qv(yt   yv); (iv.1)
if uv  ut; then ptxt + qtytSt St  ptxv +
qtyt
St
Sv; (iv.2)
if uv > ut; then ptxt +
qtyt
St
St < ptxv +
qtyt
St
Sv: (iv.3)
In other words, to impose homotheticity of the subutility function, we only need to add the ad-
ditional (linear) restriction that δt = St/qtyt to the earlier weak separability conditions. As such, by
substituting in theMIP problemCS.WS each occurrence of δt by St/qtyt (or by imposing the additional
restriction that δt = St/qtyt ), we obtain a MIP formulation of the necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for homothetic separability. In view of our following empirical application, it is also worth noting that
eorem 5 implies two necessary conditions for the data to be rationalized by homothetic separability.
More precisely, the whole data set D = fpt;qt;xt;ytgt2T needs to satisfy  and, secondly, the data
fqt;ytgt2T also needs to satisfy the homothetic axiom of revealed preference (); see Varian (1983)
for a detailed discussion of .
As a ﬁnal result we state the revealed preference conditions for indirect weak separability. First of
all, let us normalize the prices pt and qt such that, for all t, ptxt + qtyt = 1. en, we say that the data
setD = fpt;qt;xt;ytgt2T is rationalizable by indirect weak separability if there exist a well-behaved (i.e.
decreasing, convex and continuous) indirect utility function v and a well–behaved indirect subutility
function w such that, for all observations t 2 T,
fpt;qtg 2 argmin v(p;w(q)) s.t. pxt + qyt  1: (1)
e next theorem gives a characterization of data sets that are rationalizable in terms of an indirect
weakly separable utility function. e result is obtained by combining the result in eorem 2 with
Brown and Shannon (2000) ’s rationalizability conditions for an indirect utility function. See also Hjert-
strand and Swoﬀord (2012) for a similar result.
eorem 6. e following statements are equivalent:
(i) e data set D = fpt;qt;xt;ytgt2T is rationalizable by indirect weak separability.
(ii) For all t 2 T there exist numbers Vt and Wt and strict positive numbers λt and δt such that, for all
t; v 2 T,
Wt  Wv   δvyv(qt   qv); (v.1)
Vt   Vv   λv

xv(pt   pv) + 1 δv (Wt  Wv)

: (v.2)
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If we introduce the variables St =  Wt and Ut =  Vt, we can reformulate (v.1)-(v.2) as:
St   Sv  δvyv(qt   qv); (v.1)
Ut   Uv  λv

xv(pt   pv) + 1δv (St   Sv)

: (v.2)
Observe that the conditions in this theorem are formally equivalent to the conditions (iii.1)–(iii.2)
ineorem 2 with prices and quantities interchanged. us two necessary conditions for the data to be
rationalized by indirect separability are that the data sets fxt;yt;pt;qtgt2T and fyt;qtgt2T both satisfy
. Finally, from (v.1)–(v.2) and by a direct application of eorem 4, we can show that the rational-
izability conditions ineorem 6 are equivalent to the following set of MIP constraints:
CS.WSIere exist numbers St; uv 2 [0; 1[, δt 2]0; 1] and binary variables Xt;v 2 f0; 1g such that, for
all t; v 2 T,
St   Sv  δvyv(qt   qv); (csi.1)
ut   uv < Xt;v; (csi.2)
(Xt;v   1)  ut   uv; (csi.3)
δtxt(pt   pv) + (St   Sv) < Xt;vAt; (csi.4)
(Xt;v   1)Av  δvxv(pt   pv) + (St   Sv): (csi.5)
Again, At is a ﬁxed number larger than ptxt + 1.
4 Empirical application
We apply our integer programming tests to data drawn from the Encuesta Contunua de Presopuestos
Familiares (ECPF) Survey. e ECPF is a quarterly budget survey (1985–1997) that interviews about
3200 Spanish households on their consumption expenditures. For each household, the survey provides
consumption observations for a maximum of eight consecutive quarters. See Browning and Collado
(2001) and Crawford (2010) for a more detailed explanation of this data set. We exclude all households
with less than eight observations. In the end, this obtains a panel with 1585 households. e data set
covers consumption decisions for 15 (nondurable) goods: (i) food and non-alcoholic drinks at home,
(ii) alcohol, (iii) tobacco, (iv) energy at home, (v) services at home, (vi) nondurables at home, (vii)
nondurable medicines, (viii) medical services, (ix) transportation, (x) petrol, (xi) leisure, (xii) personal
services, (xiii) personal nondurables, (xiv) restaurant and bars and (xv) traveling holiday. We follow
Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2007) and deﬁne the separable group to include all goods except
food (i.e. the separable group contains all goods except (i), (ii) and (xiv)). is separability assumption
is frequently used in empirical analysis of consumption behavior.
To avoid (debatable) preference homogeneity assumptions across similar households, ourmain anal-
ysis will focus on individual households. In other words, we test separability on a time-series data
set (with 8 observations) for every diﬀerent household. is practice eﬀectively accounts for inter-
household heterogeneity and, thus, optimally exploits the panel structure of our particular data set. At
this point, two preliminary remarks are in order. First, to assess the computational speed of our MIP
method, we will construct larger data sets by pooling households on the basis of similar characteris-
tics. is will also show the practical application of our MIP approach for substantially large data sets.
Next, in the following section we will show the possible extension of our MIP formulation to account
for stochastic issues such as measurement error and unobserved preference heterogeneity. Obviously,
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unobserved heterogeneity will generally be more important in applications that involve cross-sectional
data sets (diﬀerent from our time-series data sets), which typically require strong homogeneity assump-
tions.
4.1 Evaluating the integer programming method
To assess the performance of our integer programming method, we will compare it with Varian’s three
step procedure. Next, another main focus is on evaluating the computational speed of our integer pro-
gramming approach for substantially large data sets. To this end, we will consider a preference ho-
mogeneity assumption that parallels an assumption oen used in econometric demand analysis. is
will allow us to conduct our separability tests on data sets that bring together information on multiple
(similar) households.
Comparison with Varian’s three step procedure. Our MIP formulation provides exact conditions for
rationalizability by a weakly separable utility function. To evaluate the practical usefulness of our MIP
procedure, it is interesting to compare the associated test resultswith the ones generated by the frequently
used three step procedure of Varian (1983). As discussed in Section 2, the ﬁrst two steps of Varian’s
procedure imply necessary conditions for rationalizability by a weakly separable utility function. e
ﬁrst step veriﬁes  consistency of the data set D = fpt;qt;xt;ytgt2T and the second step veriﬁes
 consistency of the data set fqt;ytgt2T. Both steps are very easy to implement. Actually, if this two
step procedure can identify almost all non–rationalizable data sets (i.e. the test has a low type II error),
then this may plead for using this (eﬃciently implementable) procedure instead of our computationally
more demanding (necessary and suﬃcient) MIP procedure.
We ﬁnd that 83% of our Spanish households (1323 out of 1585) meet the the two  conditions
of Varian’s two step procedure. By contrast, only 54% of the households (853 out of 1585) satisfy our
MIP conditions. In fact, 64% of the households that are not rationalizable by a weakly separable utility
function still satisfy Varian’s necessary conditions. In our opinion, this diﬀerence between the two test
procedures is rather signiﬁcant.
Let us now turn to Varian’s suﬃcient conditions for weak separability. ese conditions add one
step to the above two step procedure. Like before, it ﬁrst veriﬁes  consistency of the data sets D =
fpt;qt;xt;ytgt2T and fqt;ytgt2T. Subsequently, it veriﬁes  consistency of a data set fpt; 1=δt ;xt; St gt2T
for some speciﬁc values δt and St that satisfy condition (ii.1). If in this last step  is not rejected,
then we conclude that the data set is rationalizable by a weakly separable utility function. We ﬁnd that
40% of all households (636 out of 1585) pass this three step test. us, when compared to our test results
for the MIP conditions, 25% of all households that are eﬀectively consistent with weak separability do
not satisfy Varian’s suﬃcient conditions. Once more, we ﬁnd this diﬀerence quite big.
As a ﬁnal exercise, we consider the ‘adjusted’ version of Varian’s suﬃciency test that was introduced
by Fleissig and Whitney (2003). As discussed in Section 2, these authors use the theory of superlative
index numbers to deﬁne the Afriat numbers in the last step of Varian’s three step procedure. We ﬁnd that
50% of the households (794 out of 1584) satisfy the resulting suﬃcient conditions for weak separability.13
us, the diﬀerence with our MIP test results decreases quite substantially. However, we still have that
about 6.9% of the households that are consistent with weak separability do not pass this adjusted three
step test.
13We applied the test using the chain–linked Fisher ideal quantity index. We performed robustness exercises using other
popular superlative index numbers but the results did not vary very much.
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Table 1: Computational speed
size of data set number of data sets pass rate (mean) time (in seconds) var time
8 152 84 0.023 0.00001
16 87 5 0.099 0.0002
24 49 1 0.256 0.001
32 38 0 0.559 0.009
40 48 0 1.125 0.021
48 22 0 1.911 0.067
56 22 0 3.223 0.098
64 14 0 5.206 0.144
72 7 0 7.74 1.256
80 9 0 12.042 1.835
88 6 0 15.319 1.223
96 5 0 21.644 5.367
104 1 0 39.267 N.A.
120 2 0 50.543 13.256
At a more general level, we believe that these exercises also demonstrate that our exact MIP condi-
tions for weak separability can be fruitfully applied to assess (and compare) the empirical performance
of tests for weak separability that are not exact but very eﬃciently implementable. For example, for our
data set we conclude that Varian’s procedures generate test results that are considerably diﬀerent from
our MIP results, while Fleissig and Whitney’s procedure delivers much more similar (and thus ‘better’)
results.
Computational speed. e above empirical application considers data sets with (only) 8 observations.
Not very surprisingly, for such small data sets the MIP method we propose comes to a test result very
rapidly. Here, it seems interesting to assess whether this ‘speediness’ also holds if we increase the size
of the data sets. As is well known, MIP problems might become increasingly hard to solve as the size
of the problem gets larger. To assess whether our MIP method also works well for substantially large
data sets, we assume identical preferences for all households with the same age of the male and female
household members. In practice, this means that we perform our separability tests on pooled data sets
containing all households with equally aged household members. A similar homogeneity assumption is
frequently used in econometric demand analysis, i.e. demand estimation is oen conditioned on ages of
the household members as demographic factors.
As can be seen from Table 1, the size of our newly constructed data sets varies from 8 to 120 obser-
vations, with the average number of observations equal to 27.44. Clearly, this implies relatively big data
sets as compared to other data sets that have been considered in empirical revealed preference analysis.14
e third column of Table 1 reports the pass rates for the data sets of diﬀerent sizes. However, our
main interest here is in the fourth column of the table, which gives the average computation time of our
algorithm for the diﬀerent data set sizes that we consider.15 Generally, these results provide a fairly strong
case in favor of our MIP approach. For example, checking the revealed preference conditions for weak
14See, for example, Cherchye, De Rock, Sabbe, and Vermeulen (2008) for a discussion on the typical size of data sets con-
sidered in empirical revealed preference analysis.
15We performed all our computations on a laptop computer with 2.4GHz clock speed and 4GB RAM with a standard con-
ﬁguration. For solving the integer programming problem, we used the commercial solver CPLEX©.
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separability takes (on average) less than a second for data sets with up to 32 observations. However, if
we keep increasing the number of observations, the computational time increases rapidly. Nevertheless,
even for the largest data sets with 120 observations we obtain an outcome in less than a minute (on
average), which —in our opinion— is still reasonably fast.
4.2 Comparing alternative behavioral models
In this section we consider the four models introduced in Sections 2 and 3: the standard utility max-
imization model, the model that additionally imposes weak separability, the homothetic separability
model, and the model that assumes a weakly separable indirect utility function. We will evaluate the
diﬀerent models in terms of their pass rates, discriminatory power and predictive success.
Test results: pass rates and power. Table 2 reports the pass rates of the four revealed preference tests.
About 91% of the households (1445 out of 1585) satisfy the revealed preference conditions for the stan-
dard utilitymaximizationmodel (i.e. the conditions ineorem 1). By contrast, only 853 households (or
approximately 54%) satisfy the revealed preference conditions for rationalizability by weak separability
(as given by eorem 2). Remarkably, none (!) of the households satisfy the conditions for rationaliz-
ability by homothetic separability (see eorem 5).16 is already indicates that weak separability and,
to a much greater extent, homothetic separability are rather stringent assumptions. Finally, 1264 house-
holds (or approximately 80%) pass the rationalizability conditions for indirect weak separability (see
eorem 6), which is substantially more than for the other separability assumptions.
Our diverging results for weak separability and indirect weak separability can seem surprising to
some, as one may have expected these two assumptions to be about equally stringent. Still, our pass rate
results suggest that the latter assumption has a better empirical ﬁt than the former one for our sample
of households. In a sense, this may be a useful result from the perspective of econometric applications,
which oen invoke indirect weak separability (see our discussion in the Introduction). Our results reveal
that observed behavior is largely consistent with such indirect separability.
Table 2: Pass rate and Power (in percentages)
model pass rate power
mean min 1st quartile median 3rd quartile max
general ut. max. 91.17 11.13 0.0 0.2 6.5 19.9 68.4
weak separability 53.82 47.82 4.3 31.3 48.5 64.1 98.9
homothetic separability 0 99.99 99.9 100 100 100 100
indirect separability 79.75 15.99 0.0 0.9 12.8 27.3 80.9
Importantly, to meaningfully compare the diﬀerent models, one should not merely consider the cor-
responding pass rates. For example, as the weak separability model is nested within the standard utility
maximizationmodel, the formermodel will have a lower pass rate than the latter model by construction.
Indeed, Bronars (1987) and, more recently, Andreoni and Harbaugh (2008) and Beatty and Crawford
(2011) —rather convincingly— argue that revealed preference test results (indicating pass or fail of the
16To investigate the source of these violations we checked whether the households satisfy the necessary conditions for ho-
mothetic separability (see Section 3). When checking whether the second of these conditions hold (i.e. homotheticity of the
subutility function) we found that, indeed, none of the households passes the corresponding test. is means that the data
fqt;ytgt2T cannot be rationalized by a homothetic utility function for any of the households, as required by homothetic sep-
arability.
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data for some behavioral condition) should be complemented with power measures to obtain a fair em-
pirical assessment of the rationalizability conditions under evaluation. Here, power is measured as the
probability of rejecting the revealed preference test given that the model does not hold. Favorable test
results (i.e. a high pass rate for some given data), which prima facie suggest a good empirical ﬁt, have
little value if the test has little discriminatory power (i.e. the conditions are hard to reject for the data at
hand).
For all revealed preference tests under evaluation, we compute a power measure for every individual
household. is measure quantiﬁes discriminatory power in terms of the probability to detect random
behavior, and is based on Bronars (1987). More precisely, we simulated 1000 random series of eight
consumption choices by drawing, for each of the eight observed household budgets, a random quantity
bundle from a uniform distribution on the given budget hyperplane for the corresponding prices and
total expenditure. e power measure is then calculated as one minus the proportion of these randomly
generated consumption series that are consistent with the rationalizability conditions being evaluated.
e distribution of this power measure for the diﬀerent models is given in Table 2. We see that the
standard utility maximization model has a rather low power. On average only about 11% of all random
data sets violate the revealed preference conditions of eorem 1. By contrast, the power distribution
for the homothetic separability test is entirely centered around 1, with almost no spread. In other words,
nearly all random data sets fail this test, which conﬁrms its stringency. Finally, the weak separability test
has reasonably high power while the power of the indirect weak separability test is fairly low.
is last ﬁnding suggests that, from an empirical point of view, indirect separability is much less
stringent than weak separability. at is, while the indirect weak separability model was associated
with a higher pass rate for the sample at hand, it seems that this better ﬁt may simply be due to a lower
discriminatory power rather than a better model per se. Our following exercise accounts for the possible
trade–oﬀ between pass rate and power.
Predictive success. eabove analysis compares the four behavioralmodels in terms of their pass rates
and discriminatory power. Beatty and Crawford (2011) recently suggested to combine these two (oen
inversely related) performance measures into a single metric. More speciﬁcally, building further on an
original idea of Selten (1991), they suggest to assess the empirical performance of a model by a so–called
predictive success measure which, for a given household, is computed as the diﬀerence between the
pass rate (either 1 or 0) and 1 minus the power. By construction, this measure takes values between
-1 and 1. Negative values then suggest that the model under study is rather inadequate to describe the
household data at hand: the model provides a poor ﬁt of the household behavior (pass rate is zero) even
though the model’s power is low (i.e. the model is diﬃcult to reject empirically). Conversely, a high and
positive predictive success value points to a potentially useful model: it is able to explain the observed
consumption behavior (i.e. pass rate equals 1) while its power is high (i.e. the model would rapidly be
rejected in case of random behavior).
Table 3 presents some statistics of the predictive success measures associated with the four models
under study. We observe that the standard utility maximization model achieves the highest mean pre-
dictive success. However, the value of 0.023 is still very low. In general, the mean predictive success
values do not provide a strong empirical case in favor of one or the other model.
We obtain a more balanced picture when considering the quartile values. For the homothetic sep-
arability model, the predictive success measure is entirely centered around zero with (practically) no
spread. is result directly follows from the fact that this model has, for each household, a zero pass rate
combined with power (close to) unity. Next, the distributions of the predictive success measures are al-
most identical for the standard utility maximization model and the indirect weak separability model. In
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other words, indirect separability seems to add little value (if any) over and above basic utilitymaximiza-
tion in terms of predictive success. Finally, the predictive success distribution of the weak separability
model seems to be bimodal: on the one hand, there are a lot of households with very negative predictive
success values for weak separability but, on the other hand, there are also a lot of households with large
and positive predictive success values. One interpretation is that the weak separability model performs
rather well empirically for one subgroup of households while it does a fairly poor job for other house-
holds. Given this, it can be useful to investigate which household characteristics determine the good
ﬁt of the weak separability model. Because our empirical application is mainly meant to be illustrative,
we will not explore this route here, but we do see this as a potentially interesting avenue for follow–up
research.
A related point concerns the observation that the weak separability model dominates the indirect
weak separability model in terms of predictive success for the median, third quartile and maximum
values. is suggests that weak separability may eﬀectively constitute an appropriate model to describe
the consumption behavior of most households in our sample. While it provides a worse ﬁt than indirect
separability at the overall sample level, for those households that do pass the weak separability test the
higher discriminatory power eﬀectively makes this model more useful from an empirical point of view.
at is, for many households we obtain a predictive success value that is substantially above zero.
Table 3: Predictive success
model mean min 1st quartile median 3rd quartile max
general ut. max. 0.023  1 0 0.035 0.177 0.649
weak separability 0.016  0.957  0.414 0.139 0.444 0.964
homothetic separability 0  0.001 0 0 0 0
indirect separability  0.042  1 0 0.024 0.207 0.757
5 Stochastic issues
Until now, we considered the basic revealed preference test of weak separability. is is a ‘sharp’ test in
the sense that it does not take into account stochastic issues such as measurement error and unobserved
preference heterogeneity. It only tells us, for the data at hand, whether the households are exact opti-
mizers in terms of a weakly separable utility function. However, because stochastic issues are important,
this exactness is not innocuous. Interestingly, as we will show, it is fairly easy to extend our integer pro-
gramming approach to explicitly account formeasurement error and unobserved heterogeneity. Wewill
illustrate the practical usefulness of these methodological extensions by recapturing the empirical appli-
cation of the previous section. For brevity we will only consider tests for weak separability. However, our
reasoning is also directly applicable to the models of homothetic separability and indirect separability.
5.1 Measurement error
When focusing on measurement error, there are two possible cases where the sharp test can produce a
wrong answer. In the ﬁrst case, the true data are rationalizable but, due to the measurement error, the
observed data are not, i.e. we have a so called ‘false negative’. In the second case, the true data are not
rationalizable although the observed data are, i.e. we have a ‘false positive’. We will show how to extend
our integer programming framework to develop a statistical test procedure that accounts for these two
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situations. Although our focus here will be on measurement error in the quantities, our analysis can
easily be adapted to take into account measurement error in the prices.17
We consider the following optimization problem.
OP.WS
min
St;δt;Xt;v;F
F
s.t.
St   Sv  δvqv(yt   yv) + δvF;
ut   uv < Xt;v;
(Xt;v   1)  ut   uv;
δtpt(xt   xv) + (St   Sv) < Xt;vAt + δtF;
(Xt;v   1)Av  δvpv(xt   xv) + (St   Sv) + δvF;
St  0;
δt > 0;
Xt;v 2 f0; 1g:
When comparing this problem with the earlier program CS.WS, we observe that the optimal solution
of OP.WS, say F, must be smaller than or equal to zero if and only if the data set is rationalizable by a
weakly separable utility function. In other words, the data set fpt;qt;xt;ytgt2T satisﬁes CS.WS if and
only if F  0.
A false negative. Let (xt;yt) represent the observed quantities at observation t and assume that the
true quantities are given by (xt ;yt ); where
xt = xt + εt and,
yt = yt + υt;
with εt and υt deﬁning the unobserved measurement error.
If we have a false negative, then the true data set is rationalizable by aweakly separable utility function
(i.e. it satisﬁes the conditions of CS.WS), while the observed data set is not because the quantities are
measured with error. is means that the optimal solution of OP.WS is larger than zero for the actual
data but, if we had used the true quantities, then this solution value would not have exceeded zero. As
such, if the true data set is rationalizable, we should have that F is not too large. e following theorem
formalizes this intuition by giving an upper bound on the optimal value of OP.WS. e proof is given
in Appendix C.
eorem 7. Assume that fpt;qt;xt ;yt gt2T satisĕes the constraints of CS.WS and let F be the optimal
value of OP.WS for the observed data set fpt;qt;xt;ytgt2T. en,
F  max

max
t;v
pt(εt   εv);maxt;v qt(υt   υv)

:
17See for instance Crawford (2010) and Cherchye, Demuynck, and De Rock (2011b) for examples of revealed preference
tests that take into account measurement error in the prices. Actually, as we will elaborate further on, our method to deal with
unobserved heterogeneity will be formally similar to one that accounts for measurement error in prices.
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is theorem motivates the following formulation of the null hypothesis that fpt;qt;xt ;yt gt2T is
rationalizable by a weakly separable utility function:
H0 : F  max

max
t;v
pt(εt   εv);maxt;v qt(υt   υv)

;
H1 : F > max

max
t;v
pt(εt   εv);maxt;v qt(υt   υv)

:
It is directly apparent that a test of this null hypothesis for false negatives will be a conservative one. A
similar qualiﬁcation applies to the test for false positives which will be developed below. e distribution
of the errors εt and υt is unknown, so we resort to a simulation procedure in order to implement the
hypothesis test. is procedure takes the following steps:
1. Compute the optimal value of OP.WS.
2. Simulate errors "t and υt drawn from some predeﬁned distribution and calculate the value
max fmaxt;v pt(εv   εt);maxt;v qt(υv   υt)g. We have 5000 draws (per household).
3. Compute the percentage of these values that exceeds the optimal value of OP.WS computed in the
ﬁrst step.
4. If this percentage is smaller than α, then we reject the hypothesis that the true data set is rational-
izable by a weakly separable utility function for a signiﬁcance level of α.
is test procedure is a variation of the one originally developed by Fleissig andWhitney (2008) and
Jones and Edgerton (2009).18 In order to apply it, two issues must be resolved. First of all, the optimal
value of OP.WSmust be computed. e optimization problem is nonlinear in the variable F and might
therefore be considered diﬃcult. However, notice that if OP.WS has a feasible solution for a particular
value of F, then it also has a feasible solution for all values of F0  F. From this monotonicity condition,
it follows that we can solve the problem quite eﬃciently by using a binary search algorithm.19
e second issue relates to specifying the structure and distribution of the errors "t and υt. In this
respect, we emphasize that the algorithm above is not pertained to a particular error structure or un-
derlying error distribution, but can, in fact, take on diﬀerent error structures and any imaginable error
distribution. In our application, we choose a multiplicative error structure: "t = ηt xt and υt = ζ t yt,
where ηt and ζ t are diagonal matrices with the diagonals i.i.d. mean zero distributed. So even if other er-
ror structures, such as an additive one, are of course amenable, we choose a multiplicative structure here
because it eﬀectively accounts for diﬀerences in the scale of expenditure across goods and observations.
As for the error distribution, our analysis will consider two diﬀerent speciﬁcations for the distribution
of the diagonals of ηt and ζ t: a normal and a uniform distribution, both characterized by their standard
deviation.20 We choose to focus on these two distributions because they are deﬁned in terms of a single
18See also Varian (1985) and Epstein and Yatchew (1985) for procedures to account for measurement error in revealed
preference tests.
19A binary search algorithm starts with an infeasible lower bound, F`, and a feasible upper bound, Fu, for the objective
function. For each step of the algorithm, the procedure evaluates whether the midpoint (Fu + F`)/2 is feasible. If it is, then in
the next iteration the upper bound Fu is replaced by this midpoint. If the midpoint is not feasible, then the midpoint replaces
the lower bound F`. At each iteration of the algorithm, the range [F`; Fu], which contains the solution of the problem, is halved.
As such, the width of the interval decreases exponential in the number of iterations.
20In order to make the results for the two distributions easily comparable, we report the results of the uniform distribution
in terms of its standard deviation (and not its range, as is conventionally done).
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parameter only. Also, we believe that the normal and uniform distributions are suﬃciently divergent
to meaningfully assess the robustness of our test results with respect to alternative error speciﬁcations.
Given this, however, we stress that any other error distribution is applicable, and that for large enough
data sets, one may also use a nonparametric estimation of demand to obtain a corresponding estimate
of the error distribution. See, for example, Epstein and Yatchew (1985) for an extensive discussion of
this possibility (including estimation properties) in a formally similar context.
Table 4 presents the result of our procedure for the 732 households that fail the ‘sharp’ weak separa-
bility test. e entries in the table give the percentage of households for which we reject the null hypoth-
esis of rationalizability by a weakly separable utility function for various levels of α. As an example on
how to interpret these numbers, take the case where the errors are normally distributed with a standard
deviation of 0.35% and a signiﬁcance level α of 0.05. en, we have that the null of rationalizability by
weak separability is rejected for 2.6% of all households (that violated the ‘sharp’ conditions CS.WS). In
other words, almost 97% of the households are labeled as false negatives. Not surprisingly, Table 4 also
reveals that the number of households rejecting the null is decreasing drastically with the level of the
standard deviation. Also, the results for the two distributions are very similar, which indicates that our
results are robust with respect to the assumed error distribution.
Table 4: percentage of households for which H0 is rejected at the given signiﬁcance level
Normal distribution Signiﬁcance level
Standard deviation α = 0:01 α = 0:05 α = 0:10
0.005/100 91.25 93.72 94.39
0.05/100 42.08 49.44 53.01
0.15/100 13.39 19.54 21.44
0.35/100 1.63 2.60 3.69
0.55/100 0.42 0.83 0.96
Uniform distribution Signiﬁcance level
Standard deviation α = 0:01 α = 0:05 α = 0:10
0.005/100 93.20 94.00 94.69
0.05/100 48.36 52.18 54.5
0.15/100 19.21 21.66 23.71
0.35/100 2.72 3.54 4.77
0.55/100 0.82 0.82 1.5
A false positive. A false positive means that the true data set is actually not rationalizable by a weakly
separable utility function but, due to measurement error, we conclude that the observed data set is ra-
tionalizable. In this case, the optimal solution of OP.WS should be less than or equal to zero, while
this value would be larger than zero if the true data set were used. As such, if the true data set is not
rationalizable, we would expect that F is not too far below zero. e following theorem formalizes this
intuition. Like before, the proof is given in Appendix C.
eorem 8. Assume that fpt;qt;xt ;yt gt2T does not satisfy the constraints of CS.WS and let F be the
optimal value of OP.WS for the observed data set fpt;qt;xt;ytgt2T. en,
F > min

min
t;v
pt(εv   εt);mint;v qt(υv   υt)

:
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is result allows us to formulate the following null hypothesis based on the null that the true data
fpt;qt;xt ;yt gt2T is not rationalizable by a weakly separable utility function.
H0 : F > min

min
t;v
pt(εt   εv);mint;v qt(υv   υt)

;
H1 : F  min

min
t;v
pt(εt   εv);mint;v qt(υv   υt)

:
us, one rejects the null of no rationalizability for large negative values of F. Analogous to above,
we use a simulation based procedure to implement the corresponding hypothesis test.
1. Compute the optimal value of OP.WS.
2. Simulate errors "t and υt drawn from some predeﬁned distribution and calculate the value
min fmint;v pt(εt   εv);mint;v qt(υv   υt)g. We have 5000 draws (per household).
3. Compute the percentage of these values that are below the optimal value of OP.WS computed in
the ﬁrst step.
4. If this percentage is smaller than α, then we reject the hypothesis that the true data set is not
rationalizable for a signiﬁcance level of α.
Table 5 presents the results of the procedure for the 853 households that satisfy the sharp rational-
izability test. Like before, we consider both normal and uniform distributions. e results in Table 5
have a similar interpretation as the ones in Table 4. As an example, let us again consider the setting
with normally distributed errors with a standard deviation of 0:35%, and a signiﬁcance level α of 0.05.
We then reject the null hypothesis of non–rationalizability for 62.28% of the households for which the
observed data did satisfy the sharp test. In other words, about 37% of the households can be labeled as
false positives. Again as one can expect, we conclude that the number of household rejecting the null
decreases if the standard deviation increases.
Finally, comparing the test results in Tables 4 and 5 may suggest that we should care much more
about false negatives than about false positives, if we believe measurement error is an issue for the data
at hand. However, drawing such a conclusion is misleading for several reasons. First of all, in order to
compare the two tests, we should control for the power of the diﬀerent tests. is power will generally
depend on the nature of the data that are involved. For compactness, we choose not to explore this
power issue further in this paper. Second, the test results in the two tables pertain to distinct subsets of
observations, with possibly diﬀerent characteristics. Finally, we observe that both tests are conservative
by construction. As such, for a given signiﬁcance level, they only identify lower bounds on the numbers
of false positives and negatives. is also means that the true probability values (under the null) of the
test statistics are unknown, which makes the test results incomparable.
5.2 Unobserved heterogeneity
Apart frommeasurement error, a second stochastic issue concerns unobserved preference heterogeneity
underlying the consumption data. Preference heterogeneity is oen prevalent in the context of cross-
sectional data that involvemultiple consumers. Indeed, if cross-sectional data are ‘averaged’ to represent
the behavior a single ‘representative’ consumer, it may well be that this representative consumer does
not act as being rational, even though each individual consumer is separately rational (see for instance
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Table 5: percentage of households for which H0 is rejected at the given signiﬁcance level
Normal distribution Signiﬁcance level
Standard deviation α = 0:01 α = 0:05 α = 0:10
0.005/100 97.54 98.23 98.23
0.05/100 80.61 83.42 84.62
0.15/100 67.33 70.03 71.91
0.35/100 60.29 62.28 63.10
0.55/100 54.76 58.06 59.58
Uniform distribution Signiﬁcance level
Standard deviation α = 0:01 α = 0:05 α = 0:10
0.005/100 98.24 98.24 98.48
0.05/100 83.10 84.61 86.02
0.15/100 69.45 71.80 73.44
0.35/100 62.40 63.10 63.46
0.55/100 58.17 59.46 60.40
Lewbel (2001) for a discussion). In our own application, however, we use a panel data set and test ratio-
nality for each household separately. By construction, this practice maximally accounts for preference
heterogeneity across households. Nonetheless, heterogeneity may still arise if household preferences
vary over time.
In what follows, we will present a method to account for preference heterogeneity in our integer
programming framework. We will illustrate this method for our sample of households, thus considering
the possibility of time-varying household preferences. We will abstract from measurement error in this
discussion. However, we hope itwill be clear from the exposition that one can easily combine ourmethod
to account for preference heterogeneity with the above one to incorporate measurement error.
In our method, we adopt the random utility model with additive heterogeneity that was originally
put forward by Brown and Matzkin (1998).21 is model assumes that household preferences are rep-
resented by the following utility function:
U(x;y) = u(x; s(y)) + "x+ υy;
where the vectors " and υ capture preference variation (e.g. over time). Attractively, even though the
model is fairly simple, it is eﬀective in describing preference variation in an intuitive manner, through a
suitable speciﬁcation of " and υ (e.g. it can directly impose that heating provides more utility in winter
than in summer).22
In the above model speciﬁcation, the random term "x+ υy is measured in utility units. To accom-
modate for this, we choose to express the vectors " and υ in monetary terms, by dividing them by the
marginal utility of income. is gives:
γ = "λ and σ =
υ
λ ;
21See also Beckert and Blundell (2008) for further analysis and extensions of this type of random preferences.
22For more elaborated models dealing with heterogeneity non-additively, we refer to Matzkin (2003) and Matzkin (2008).
To compactify our discussion and to enhance comparability with our measurement error procedures we opted not to focus on
these models in the current paper.
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with λ the lagrange multiplier corresponding to the budget constraint of the utility maximization prob-
lem (i.e. the marginal utility of income).
Interestingly, this particular set-up entails a method to account for unobserved heterogeneity that
is formally similar to the one we used to deal with measurement error. We see this by deﬁning the
ﬁrst order conditions of the utility maximization problem associated with the random utility function
speciﬁed above. For a given set of prices pt and qt, these conditions are:
@u(x; s(y)
@x
= λt(pt   γt);
@u(x; s(y)
@s
@s(y)
@y
= λt(qt   σt):
us, in terms of testable implications, the random utility model with additive heterogeneity is equiva-
lent to a standard utility maximization model with the price vectors pt and qt replaced by pt   γt and
qt   σt. In other words, the model is empirically equivalent to a model with measurement errors in the
prices, where the true prices are given by pt = pt   γt and qt = qt   σt (with γt and σt price errors).
is allows us to treat our model with unobserved preference heterogeneity ‘as if ’ it were a model with
measurement error in the prices. As suchwe can easily compare the impact of our two types of stochastic
noise. Reformulatingeorem 7 then gives the following result.
eorem 9. Assume that fpt ;qt ;xt;ytgt2T satisĕes the constraints of CS.WS and let F be the optimal
value of OP.WS for the observed data set fpt;qt;xt;ytgt2T. en,
F  max

max
t;v
 γv(xt   xv);maxt;v  σv(qt   qv)

:
Analogous to before, this theoremmotivates the next formulation of the null hypothesis that fpt;qt;xt;ytgt2T
is rationalizable by a weakly separable utility function under unobserved preference heterogeneity:
H0 : F  max

max
t;v
 γv(xt   xv);maxt;v  σv(qt   qv)

;
H1 : F > max

max
t;v
 γv(xt   xv);maxt;v  σv(qt   qv)

:
Again, we see that a test of this null hypothesis will be a conservative one. Like before, because the
distribution of the errors γt and σt is unknown, we need a simulation procedure to implement the test:
1. Compute the optimal value of OP.WS.
2. Simulate errors γt and σt drawn from some predeﬁned distribution and calculate the value
max

maxt;v γv(xt   xv);maxt;v σv(qt   qv)
	
.
3. Compute the percentage of these values that exceeds the optimal value of OP.WS computed in the
ﬁrst step.
4. If this percentage is smaller than α, then we reject the hypothesis that the true data set is rational-
izable by a weakly separable but heterogeneous utility function for a signiﬁcance level of α.
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Once more, our method can incorporate any possible distribution of the errors γt and σt. In prin-
ciple, it is possible to estimate the demand distribution nonparametrically if data sets are large enough.
We refer to Brown andMatzkin (1998) for a related discussion on identiﬁcation and estimation issues for
the random utility model that we consider here. Similar to above, because our application uses a small
data set per household, we will focus on γt = ηt pt and σt = ζ t qt, where ηt and ζ t are diagonal matrices
with the diagonals being i.i.d. mean zero distributed. is speciﬁcation is a realistic one if we believe that
heterogeneity shocks are larger for goods with higher prices (or, equivalently, if the associated marginal
utilities are higher). We again consider both normal and uniform distributions for the diagonals of ηt
and ζ t.
Table 6 reports the results of our simulations. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that these results roughly parallel
the ones in Table 4, which pertained to measurement error in the quantities. For example, the number
of households rejecting the null is strongly decreasing in the standard deviation. As a conclusion, we
may state that, for the given sample of households and our speciﬁc modeling assumptions, the eﬀect of
unobserved heterogeneity on our test results is largely similar to the eﬀect of measurement error in the
quantities.
Table 6: percentage of households for which H0 is rejected at the given signiﬁcance level
Normal distribution Signiﬁcance level
Standard deviation α = 0:01 α = 0:05 α = 0:10
0.005/100 94.28 95.50 95.78
0.05/100 58.45 64.03 67.57
0.15/100 29.84 35.42 38.69
0.35/100 9.26 14.17 16.76
0.55/100 2.86 5.04 6.95
Uniform distribution Signiﬁcance level
Standard deviation α = 0:01 α = 0:05 α = 0:10
0.005/100 95.64 95.91 96.18
0.05/100 64.71 68.26 70.71
0.15/100 35.69 39.24 41.55
0.35/100 15.53 18.12 20.30
0.55/100 5.05 7.90 9.67
6 Conclusion
We considered the revealed preference conditions for weak separability. From a theoretical perspective,
we found that verifying these conditions is a diﬃcult (= –complete) problem. Given this, we intro-
duced an integer programming approach to test data consistency with the conditions. We illustrated the
versatility of this approach by deriving formally similar integer programming tests for the cases of ho-
mothetic separability and indirect weak separability. Finally, we presented statistical tests that account
for measurement error in the data and unobserved preference heterogeneity underlying the observed
consumption behavior.
Further, we showed the empirical viability of our integer programming approach by providing an
application to Spanish household consumption data. In this application, we focused on separability
between food expenditures and other expenditures (on nondurables). An interesting observation was
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that indirect weak separability was associated with a higher pass rate than weak separability for the
sample of households at hand. However, we also found that the weak separability test had substantially
more discriminatory power than the indirect separability test. As a result, the weak separability model
was associated with a rather favorable predictive success measure (indicating a high degree of empirical
usefulness) for most households considered.
We see multiple avenues for further research. First of all, at the theoretical level, we have concen-
trated on the three most commonly used types of separability, which have been established and imple-
mented in the literature for a long time: weak separability, homothetic separability and indirect weak
separability. More recently, Blundell and Robin (2000) introduced the notion of latent separability, a
generalization of weak separability that provides an attractive empirical and theoretical framework for
investigating the grouping of goods and prices. Crawford (2004) has derived the revealed preference
conditions for latent separability. As in the weak separability case, the latent separability conditions are
nonlinear (quadratic) and thus hard to verify. We believe it would be interesting to explore whether
and to what extent the integer programming approach set out in the current paper may help to derive
necessary and/or suﬃcient testable (integer programming) formulations of Crawford’s conditions for
latent separability.
Next, at themethodological level, we focused our discussion by only considering revealed preference
tests for alternative separability speciﬁcations. If observed behavior is consistent with a particular spec-
iﬁcation (i.e. can be rationalized), then a natural next question pertains to recovering/identifying the
structural features of the model under consideration. For example, in the present context such recovery
can focus on identifying group (price/quantity) indices that are consistent with a separable representa-
tion of the utility structure. Because the revealed preference approach does not require a prior speciﬁ-
cation for the utility functions, it addresses recovery questions by ‘letting the data speak for themselves’
(i.e. it only uses the information that is directly revealed by the data). See, for example, Afriat (1967) and
Varian (1982) for detailed discussions of revealed preference recoverability. ese authors consider the
standard utility maximization model. By using the integer programming formulations developed in the
current paper, one can address similar recovery questions under alternative separability assumptions.23
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Appendix A: proof ofeorem 3
Proof. In order to show that the problem of rationalizability by a weakly separable utility function is in
the class , we need to reduce a known -complete problem to this decision problem. For this we use
the problem of Monotone 3SAT (M3SAT; see Garey and Johnson (1979)).
M3SAT
INSTANCE: A set of binary variables b1; : : : ; bt and a set of clauses C1; : : : ;Cr. Each clause C`, ` =
1; : : : ; r, contains three literals l1;`; l2;` and l3;` and each literal either equals a variable or its negation.
e condition monotone refers to the fact that for every clause all literals within this clause are either
negated or unnegated.
QUESTION: Does there exist an assignment to the variables b1; : : : ; bt (either 1 or 0) such that each
clause contains at least one literal with the values equal to 1?
Now, consider an instance of M3SAT. We ﬁrst construct the set of observations T and the sets of goods
T and S.:
• For every literal lk;` (` = 1; : : : ; r and k = 1; 2; 3), we construct two observations t(k; `) and
v(k; `). ese observations are gathered in the set T0.
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Table 7: Prices and quantities for instance of weak separability
observation g(t; k; `) Gt   fg(t; k; `)g Gv  O(t; k; `) O(t; k; `)
t(k; `) pj1 1j2 1j2 1j1  1
p
observation h(t; k; `) Ht   fh(t; k; `)g h(v; k; `) Hv   fh(v; k; `)g
t(k; `) zj2 1j3 1j1  1
y
1j2
observation g(v; k; `) Gt Gv   fg(v; k; `)g
v(k; `) pj1 1j2 1j2
observation h(t; k 2; `) Ht   fh(t; k 2; `)g h(v; k; `) Hv   fh(v; k; `)g
v(k; `) 1j1 1j3 yj1 1j2
• For every literal lk;` (` = 1; : : : ; r and k = 1; 2; 3), we create two goods g(t; k; `) and g(v; k; `).
• For every literal lk;` (` = 1; : : : ; r and k = 1; 2; 3), we create two goods h(t; k; `) and h(v; k; `).
For two literals l and l0, we say that they are opposites if l corresponds to a variable bi and l0 corre-
sponds to (1   bi) or l corresponds to (1   bi) and l0 corresponds to bi (i.e. l  (1   l0)). We consider
some special subsets of the set of goods.
• Gt = fg(t; k; `)jk = 1; 2; 3; ` = 1; : : : ; rg.
• Gv = fg(v; k; `)jk = 1; 2; 3; ` = 1; : : : ; rg.
• O(t; k; `) =

g(v; k0; `0)
 the k-th literal in clause ` and the k0th literalin clause `0 are opposites

.
• Ht = fh(t; k; `)jk = 1; 2; 3; ` = 1; : : : ; rg.
• Hv = fh(v; k; `)jk = 1; 2; 3; ` = 1; : : : ; rg.
e goods in the separable group (bundle y) are the goods g(t; k; `) and g(v; k; `). For k and l 2 N
denote by k l the number (k+ l) mod 3. e remaining goods are the goods for the non–separable
group (bundle x). e prices and quantities for each observation and good are summarized in the fol-
lowing tables for all k = 1; 2; 3 and ` = 1; : : : ; r (prices are before the separator ‘j’, quantities aer).
Here, the numbers p; z and y are given by:
p = 14 + 35r; z = 16 + 42r; y = 11 + 29r;
with r the number of clauses.
We have to show that M3SAT has a solution if and only if the data set constructed above is weakly
separable rationalizable. First let us assume that the data set is weakly separable rationalizable. Let
St(k;`) and Sv(k;`) and Ut(k;`);Uv(k;`) be the Afriat numbers for the observations t(k; `) and v(k; `) that
correspond to this rationalization. e idea is to set the value of the variables in such away as to guarantee
that the kth literal in the `th clause is equal to one whenever St(k;`)  Sv(k;`). We need to verify that this
is possible and that this leads to a solution of M3SAT. e following facts will be helpful.
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Fact 1. For all k; k0 = 1; 2; 3 and `; `0 = 1; : : : ; r, if the kth literal in the `th clause and the k0th literal in
the `0th are opposites, then Sv(k;`) > St(k0;`0).
Proof. We have that:
St(k0;`0)   Sv(k;`)  δv(k;`)qv(k;l)

yt(k0;`0)   yv(k;`)

= δv(k;`)
 1  1 + ( 2 + 1  1=p) O(t; k0; `0) \ (Gv   fg(v; k; `)g)
< 0
Fact 2. For all `; `0 = 1; : : : ; r and k; k0 = 1; 2; 3 if the kth literal in the `th clause and the k0th literal in
the `0th clause are opposites then it is not the case that both St(k;`)  Sv(k;`) and St(k0;`0)  Sv(k0;`0).
Proof. If, on the contrary, St(k;`)  Sv(k;`) and St(k0;`0)  Sv(k0;`0), we would have that (by fact 1):
St(k;`)  Sv(k;`) > St(k0;`0)  Sv(k0;`0) > St(k;`);
a contradiction.
Facts 1 and 2 show that above construction above can be performed (i.e. it is never the case that two
opposite literals have the value of one). e following fact demonstrates that it provides a solution to
M3SAT.
Fact 3. For all ` = 1; : : : ; r, there is at least one value k = 1; 2; 3 such that St(k;`)  Sv(k;`).
Proof. Let us ﬁrst show that for all k = 1; 2; 3 and ` = 1; : : : ; r, Ut(k;`) > Uv(k1;`). Indeed,
Uv(k1;`)   Ut(k;`)  λt(k;`)pt(k;`)

xv(k1;`)   xt(k;`)

+ λt(k;`)qt(k;`)

yv(k1;`)   yt(k;`)

= λt(k;`)

p  1 + (2  1 + 1=p) jO(t; k; `) \ (Gv   fg(v; k; `g)j
 z+ (2  1 + 1=y) + (1  2)

 λt(k;`) [p  1 + 6r  z+ 2  1]
= λt(k;`) [(14 + 35r) + 6r  (16 + 42r)] < 0
Now, consider the identity
0 =

Uv(k1;`)   Ut(k;`)

+

Uv(k2;`)   Ut(k1;`)

+

Uv(k3;`)   Ut(k2;`)

+

Ut(k;`)   Uv(k;`)

+

Ut(k1;`)   Uv(k1;`)

+

Ut(k2;`)   Uv(k2;`)

e ﬁrst three terms on the right hand side are negative, hence,
0 <

Ut(k;`)   Uv(k;`)

+

Ut(k1;`)   Uv(k1;`)

+

Ut(k2;`)   Uv(k2;`)

λv(1;`)δv(1;`)

St(1;`)   Sv(1;`)

+
λv(2;`)
δv(k1;`)

St(2;`)   Sv(2;`)

+
λv(3;`)
δv(3;`)

St(3;`)   Sv(3;`)

As such at least for one k = 1; 2; 3 it must be that St(k;`) > Sv(k;`).
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Now, consider a ‘yes’ instance of M3SAT. We need to construct Afriat numbers S and δ for each
observation that satisfy the the conditions for rationalizability by weak separability (seeeorem 2). Let
us start by constructing a binary relation . For k; k0 = 1; 2; 3 and `; `0 = 1; : : : ; r if the k-th literal in
the `th clause and the k0th literal in the `0th clause are opposites, we set v(k; `)  t(k0; `0). Further, for
all k = 1; 2; 3 and ` = 1; : : : ; r if the kth literal in the `th clause has the value 1, we set t(k; `)  v(k; `).
ese are the only comparisons in. Observe that has no cycles and any path in contains no more
than 4 observations.
LetM1 be the set of-maximal elements of T0:
M1 = fa 2 Tj 6 9b 2 T0; b  ag:
For all observations a inM1, we set Sa = 4. LetM2 be the set of -maximal elements in T0  M1. For
all a 2 M2, set Sa = 3. Next, letM3 be the set of-maximal elements in T0  (M1[M2) and set Sa = 2
for all a 2 M3. Finally letM4 be the set of-maximal element in T0   (M1 [M2 [M3) and set for all
a 2 M4, Sa = 1. It is easy to see thatM1 [M2 [M3 [M4 = T, hence all observations are allocated a
value. Observe that when the kth literal in the `th clause equals one, then St(k;`) > Sv(k;`). Finally, for all
k = 1; 2; 3 and ` = 1; : : : ; r, set δt(k;`) = 1 and set δv(k;`) =
1
3 + 7r , where r is the number of clauses.
We need to proof two things. First we need to verify that all Afriat inequalities hold for every two
observations in the set ft(k; `); v(k; `); t(k0; `0); v(k0; `0)gk;k0=1;2;3;`;`0=1;:::;r (i.e. condition (ii.1) of e-
orem 2). Second, we need to show that the data set fpw; 1=δw;xw; Swgw2T0 satisﬁes  (condition
(ii.2)). For the ﬁrst, it is a straightforward but cumbersome exercise to verify every possible combina-
tion of states. Here, we refer to supplement 1 of this appendix. Now, let us verify the second claim.
Consider the direct revealed preference relation RD for the data set fpw; 1=δw;xw; Swgw2T0 . We have
following results.
Fact 4. For all k = 1; 2; 3 and ` = 1; : : : ; r, we have that the observation t(k; `) is directly revealed
preferred to the observation v(k 1; `) (i.e. (t(k; `); v(k 1; `)) 2 RD).
Proof. We have that:
pt(k;`)

xt(k;`)   xv(k1;`)

+
1
δt(k;`)

St(k;`)   Sv(k1;`)

= z+ (1  1=y  2) + (2  1) + St(k;`)   Sv(k1;`)
 z  2  3 = 16 + 42r  5 > 0
Fact 5. For all k = 1; 2; 3 and ` = 1; : : : ; r, (v(k; `); t(k; `)) 2 RD if and only if Sv(k;`)  St(k;`) (which
implies that the kth literal in the `th clause is equal to zero).
Proof. We have that,
pv(k;`)(xv(k;`)   xt(k;`)) +
1
δv(k;`)

Sv(k;`)   St(k;`)

=
1
δv(k;`)

Sv(k;`)   St(k;`)

:
is is positive or negative depending on the sign of Sv(k;`)   St(k;`).
Fact 6. e relation RD contains no comparisons except for the cases mentioned by Facts 4 and 5.
Proof. See supplement 2 of this appendix.
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Now, assume a violation of . Above Facts show that this implies the following cycle for some
` = 1; : : : ; r:
(t(1; `); v(2; `)); (v(2; `); t(2; `)); (t(2; `); v(3; `))
(v(3; `); t(3; `)); (t(3; `); v(1; `)); (v(1; `); t(1; `)):
Fact 5 shows that in this case Sv(1;`)  St(1;`), Sv(2;`)  St(2;`) and Sv(3;`)  St(3;`). is can only be
the case if all literals in the clause ` are zero, a contradiction.
Supplement 1. Case 1: (t(k; `); t(k0; `0))
δt(k;`)qt(k;`)

yt(k0;`0)   yt(k;`)

=
p+ (1  2) + (1  2  1=p) jG   O(t; k; `) \ O(t; k0; `0)j
+(2  1 + 1=p) jO(t; k; `) \ (Gv  O(t; k0; `0))j
 p  1  6r = 14 + 35r  6r > 3  St(k0;`0)   St(k;`)
Case 2: (v(k; `); v(k0; `0))
δv(k;`)qv(k;`)

yv(k0;`0)   yv(k;`)

= δv(k;`) [p+ (1  2)]
=
14 + 35r  1
3 + 7r > 3  Sv(k0;`0)   Sv(k;`)
Case 3: (t(k; `); v(k0; `0))
δt(k;`)qt(k;`)

yv(k0;`0)   yt(k;`)

=
p+ (1=p) jO(t; k; l) \ fg(v; k0; `0)gj
+(1  2) j(Gv  O(t; k; `)) \ fg(v; k0; `0gj
+(2  1 + 1=p) jO(t; k; l) \ (Gv   fg(v; k0; `0)g)j
 p  1 = 14 + 35r  1 > 3  Sv(k0;`0)   St(k;`)
Case 4: (v(k; `); t(k0; `0)) and the kth literal in the `th clause and the k0th literal in the `0th clause have
opposite signature. First of all, observe that 1  St(k0;`0)   Sv(k;`).
en:
δv(k;`)qv(k;`)

yt(k0;`0)   yv(k0;`0)

= δv(k;`)

p(1  1=p  1) + (1  2)
+(1  2  1=p) j(Gv   fg(v; k; `)g) \ O(t; k0; `0)j

  1  1  6r
3 + 7r >  1  St(k0;`0)   Sv(k;`)
Case 5: (v(k; `); t(k0; `0)) and the kth literal in the `th clause and the k0th literal in the `0th clause do not
have opposite signature.
δv(k;`)qv(k;`)

yt(k0;`0)   yv(k0;`0)

= δv(k;`)

p+ (1  2)
+(1  1=p  2) j(Gv   fg(v; k; `)g) \ O(t; k0; `0)j

 p  1  6r
3 + 7r =
13 + 29r
3 + 7r > 3  St(k0;`0)   Sv(k;`)
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Supplement 2. Case 1: (t(k; `); t(k0; `0))
pt(k;`)

xt(k;`)   xt(k0;`0)

+
1
δt(k;`)

St(k;`)   St(k0;`0)

=  z+ (3  2) + St(k;`)   St(k0;`0)
  16  42r+ 1 + 3 < 0
Case 2: (t(k; `); v(k0; `0)) with ` 6= `0.
pt(k;`)

xt(k;`)   xv(k0;`0)

+
1
δt(k;`)

St(k;`)   Sv(k0;`0)

=  z+ (3  1) + (1  1=y  2) + (2  1) + St(k;`)   Sv(k0;`0)
  16  42r+ 2 + 1 + 3 < 0
Case 3: (t(k; `); v(k; `))
pt(k;`)

xt(k;`)   xv(k;`)

+
1
δt(k;`)

St(k;`)   Sv(k;`)

=  z+ (3  1) + (1  1=y  1) + 1δt(k;`)

St(k;`)   Sv(k;`)

  16  42r+ 2 + 3 < 0
Case 4: (t(k; `); v(k 2; `))
pt(k;`)

xt(k;`)   xv(k2;`)

+
1
δt(k;`)

St(k;`)   Sv(k2;`)

=  z+ (3  1) + (1  1=y  2) + 1 + 1δt(k;`)

St(k;`)   Sv(k2;`)

  16  42r+ 2 + 1 + 3 < 0
Case 5: (v(k; `); v(k0; `0))
pv(k;`)

xv(k;`)   xv(k0;`0)

+
1
δv(k;`)

Sv(k;`)   Sv(k0;`0)

=  y+ (2  1) 1δv(k;`)

Sv(k;`)   Sv(k0;`0)

  11  29r+ 1 + (3 + 7r)3 < 0
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Case 6: (v(k; `); t(k0; `0)) with ` 6= `0.
pv(k;`)

xv(k;`)   xt(k0;`0)

+
1
δv(k;`)

Sv(k;`)   St(k0;`0)

= (1  3) + (3  2)  y+ (2  1 + 1=y) + 1δv(k;`)

Sv(k;`)   St(k0;`0)

  11  29r+ 1 + (3 + 7r)3 < 0
Case 7: (v(k; `); t(k 1; `))
pv(k;`)

xv(k;`)   xt(k1;`)

+
1
δv(k;`)

Sv(k;`)   St(k1;`)

= (1  3) + (3  2)  y+ (2  1 + 1=y) + 1δv(k;`)

Sv(k;`)   St(k1;`)

  11  29r+ 1 + (3 + 7r)3 < 0
Case 8: (v(k; `); t(k 2; `))
pv(k;`)

xv(k;`)   xt(k2;`)

+
1
δv(k;`)

Sv(k;`)   St(k2;`)

= (1  2)  y+ (2  1 + 1=y) + 1δv(k;`)

Sv(k;`)   St(k2;`)

  11  29r+ 1 + (3 + 7r)3 < 0
Appendix B: proof ofeorem 4
Proof. Assume that the data set D = fδtpt; 1;xt; Stgt2T satisﬁes (iv.1)–(iv.3). It is always possible to
rescale the values ut such that, for all t 2 T, ut < 1. For all t; v 2 T, deﬁne Xt;v = 1 if and only if ut  uv
(i.e. Xt;v = 0 if ut < uv) . We must show that conditions (cs.2)-(cs.5) hold. By deﬁnition, conditions
(cs.2) and (cs.3) are always satisﬁed. Let δtptxt + St  δtptxv + Sv. en form the contraposition of
(iv.3)we obtain that uv > ut can not occur. As such, ut  uv and thus Xt;v = 1. is demonstrates
that condition (cs.4) holds. Next, assume that Xt;v = 1, which is equivalent to ut  uv. From condition
(iv.2), we then obtain that δvpvxv + Sv  δvpvxt + St. is shows that (cs.5) is also satisﬁed.
For the reverse, assume that (cs.2)-(cs.5) has a solution. We need to show thatD satisﬁes (iv.2)-(iv.3).
If δtptxt + St  δtptxv + Sv, we have, from (cs.4), that Xt;v = 1. Condition (cs.3) then requires that
ut  uv. is demonstrates condition (iv.3). Next, if ut  uv, then Xt;v = 1 (from (cs.2)) and using
condition (cs.5) we see that δvpvxv + Sv  δvpvxt + St. As such, condition (iv.2) is also satisﬁed.
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Appendix C: proof ofeorems 7 and 8
Proof of eorem 7. Assume that fpt;qt;xt ;yt gt2T satisﬁes the conditions in CS.WS. en there
exist numbers St and ut, strict positive numbers δt and binary numbers Xt;v such that:
St   Sv  δvqv(yt   yv );
ut   uv < Xt;v;
(Xt;v   1)  ut   uv;
δtpt(xt   xv) + (St   Sv) < Xt;vAt;
(Xt;v   1)Av  δvpv(xt   xv) + (St   Sv):
en, given that xt = xt + εt and yt = yt + υt, we obtain that:
St   Sv  δvqv(yt   yv) + δvqv(υt   υv);
ut   uv < Xt;v;
(Xt;v   1)  ut   uv;
δtpt(xt   xv) + (St   Sv) < Xt;vAt + δtpt(εv   εt);
(Xt;v   1)Av  δvpv(xt   xv) + (St   Sv) + δvpv(εt   εv):
From this, we see that max fmaxt;v pv(εt   εv);maxt;v qv(υt   υv)g is a feasible solution for OP.WS,
from which the theorem follows.
Proof ofeorem8. Assume that fpt;qt;xt;ytgt2T satisﬁes the conditions inCS.WS.en there exist
numbers St and ut, strict positive numbers δt and binary numbers Xt;v such that the optimal solution F
of OP.WS satisﬁes:
St   Sv  δvqv(yt   yv) + δvF;
ut   uv < Xt;v;
(Xt;v   1)  ut   uv;
δtpt(xt   xv) + (St   Sv) < Xt;vAt + δtF;
(Xt;v   1)Av  δvpv(xt   xv) + (St   Sv) + δvF:
is implies that for all t and v:
F  St   Svδv   qv(yt   yv);
F  pt(xt   xv) + St   Svδt   Xt;vAt;
F  (Xt;v   1)Av   pv(xt   xv)  St   Svδv :
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As the data set fptqt;xt ;yt gt2T is not rationalizable, a similar reasoning as above shows that theremust
be a t and v such that at least one of the following inequalities holds
St   Sv
δv
  qv(yt   yv) > qv(υt   υv);
pt(xt   xv) + St   Svδt   Xt;vAt > pt(εv   εv);
(Xt;v   1)Av   pv(xt   xv)  St   Svδv > pv(εt   εv):
erefore, we can conclude that at least
F > min

min
t;v
qv(υt   υv);mint;v pv(εt   εv))

:
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